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The Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states of the European Union (EU) have 
emerged in the past decade as increasingly vocal democracy promoters, building on their own 
experience in transition from Communist rule to democracy. They have made democracy 
assistance an important component of their bilateral international development policies, and 
have been actively seeking to influence the way the EU and other international organisations 
support democratization and democratic consolidation,1 especially in the EU’s 
neighbourhood. Official rhetoric in the CEE countries argues that due to their own experience 
with, and strong belief in the transformative power of democracy, they can be highly effective 
when supporting democratization in their partner countries.  
There is now a sizeable literature analysing the democracy promotion policies and practices of 
the CEE countries, including their bilateral democracy aid, their political engagement with 
democratizing countries, and their impact on the policies of international organisations.2 
While we now know much about the motivations behind CEE democracy aid, the various 
forms it takes and how it is delivered, we still know relatively little about the interactions 
between these new promoters of democracy and their partner countries, and how they seek to 
make these more effective through planning, coordination and better implementation. 
This paper contributes to filling this gap by examining the democracy aid of the Czech 
Republic and Poland to Georgia. The aim of the paper is to determine the degree to which the 
implementation of the two CEE countries’ democracy aid in Georgia meets the criteria for 
effective democracy assistance on the donors’ side. If these countries truly perceive 
themselves as effective donors due to their transition experience, then they should be 
interested in maximizing the benefits of their democracy aid by actually using effective 
practices. 
The Czech Republic and Poland have been identified in the literature as the most active and 
consistent promoters of democracy from the CEE region,3 and have had long lasting relations 
with Georgia. Georgia is an ideal partner to examine how these CEE countries provide and 
implement democracy assistance, as in the aftermath of the 2003 Rose Revolution Georgia 
proved to be one of the more committed reformers in the post-Soviet region. After the 
Georgian-Russian war in 2008, and the launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, 
much advocated by the CEE countries,4 the relative importance of Georgia increased even 
further.  
The paper evaluates the democracy aid practices of the two donors in Georgia against three 
criteria derived from the literatures on the effectiveness of foreign and democracy aid: support 
for locally driven change, learning from results and coordination. The empirical material is 
                                                 
1 See the contributions in Berti et al. eds, Democratization in EU Foreign Policy. 
2 See for example Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics; Pospieszna, Democracy Assistance from the Third 
Wave; Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot “Central and Eastern European Transition Experience.” 
3 Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics. 
4 Dangerfield, “The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy.” 
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based on the analysis of the two countries’ democracy aid practices as reported through 
official documents, as well as 16 qualitative interviews carried out in 2015 with the two 
countries’ diplomats in Tbilisi and their respective capitals, Georgian officials in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, as well 
as Czech and Polish NGOs working in Georgia and Georgian NGOs who have worked with 
partners from the two donor countries. To ensure confidentiality, respondents remain 
anonymous.  
The main finding of the paper is that despite their rhetoric on being effective, the Czech 
Republic and Poland have made few conscious efforts to ensure that their democracy aid 
meets basic requirements of effectiveness, such as the three fundamental criteria used by this 
paper. These criteria are mirrored in the international aid effectiveness agenda (including the 
Paris Declaration of 2005 and the 2011 Busan Partnership), which both donors have endorsed, 
thus it is not unrealistic to expect them to implement these principles in their aid practice. 
Given the centrality of the ‘transition narrative’ justifying the comparative advantage of their 
democracy aid, the lack of attention to effectiveness calls into question just how seriously 
these claims should be taken. Nevertheless, the content of their assistance, based on their 
transition experience, is still seen by partners as highly relevant to the Georgian context. 
These findings show that CEE democracy aid, at least in the case of the two donors examined, 
has added value in the Eastern neighbourhood, however, more conscious efforts are needed to 
improve effectiveness on the donor side.  
Two notes are in order on what the paper does not aim to do. First, it focuses only on 
democracy assistance, defined as a part of foreign aid, either in the form of funding or 
technical assistance, which has the goal of strengthening democratic institutions, democratic 
governance by state institutions, or civil society capacities to monitor the state and foster civic 
engagement. It does not discuss political engagement and human rights advocacy directed at 
the Georgian government, nor does it focus on the political support that the two donors give 
Georgia in international organisations such as the EU or NATO. Second, the paper does not 
aim to carry out a full, formal evaluation of Czech and Polish democracy aid in Georgia. The 
three effectiveness criteria used in the paper focus on the supply side of democracy aid, and 
they thus represent those determinants of effectiveness over which donors have a significant 
degree of control. If the two countries wanted to improve the effectiveness of their democracy 
aid, the supply side would be the place to start. The ultimate impact of Czech and Polish 
democracy aid, i.e. greater levels of democracy in Georgia, is beyond their control, and 
depends on multiple factors, including Georgian political dynamics and geopolitics, which the 
donors have little or no influence on. Indeed, Schmitter5 has argued that democratization 
needs to be driven internally, and domestic limitations, as well as windows of opportunity6 are 
key to understanding change, or the lack of it. This of course does not mean that external 
interventions such as democracy aid cannot help in the process, especially if done well. 
                                                 
5 Schmitter, “The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in 
New Democracies.” 
6 Brückner and Ciccone, “Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity.” 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a review of the literature on 
democracy aid with a view of consolidating what it sees as effective practice, some 
descriptive details of the democracy aid practices of the Czech Republic and Poland are 
discussed. This is followed by the application of the insights from the aid literature to analyse 
the effectiveness of the practices of the two countries in Georgia. The final section offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
When is the supply of democracy aid effective? 
Using foreign aid to promote regime change and democratic consolidation is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Aid has traditionally focused on promoting economic development, and 
democracy was seen as something that will emerge once the right structural conditions are in 
place.7 After the early 1990s however, donors increasingly saw the creation of well 
functioning democratic institutions as a prerequisite for development.8 This shift was driven 
by a number of factors, including the end of the Cold War and the supposed triumph of liberal 
democracy; the continuation of the fourth wave of democracy; new generation of peace and 
state building interventions; a general aid fatigue; and new arguments put forward by the 
academic literature, mainly new institutionalist political economy.9 Many donors thus began 
using parts of their foreign aid budgets to promote democratic change. While the democracy 
aid practices of the United States have received much attention, the EU created a dedicated 
aid instrument to support democratization, the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights in 1994, and bilateral donors also began introducing democratization 
programmes.10  
Democracy aid, just like foreign aid in general, involves a transfer of resources or expertise 
between a donor and a recipient. Thus, the literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid can be 
a good starting point for deriving criteria to assess the effectiveness of democracy aid. This 
literature generally agrees that aid can be effective in promoting development and reducing 
poverty, but only under certain circumstances.11 These circumstances refer to either 
conditions in the recipient country, or to how donors give aid. Recipient country 
characteristics relate to well functioning institutions, effective state bureaucracies, low levels 
of corruption, and some degree of democracy.12 On the donor side, many (seemingly 
technical) fixes have been identified which can improve aid effectiveness, including greater 
coordination and harmonisation between donors, alignment with recipient country priorities 
and ensuring recipient ownership, untying aid from exports, using recipient country systems, 
                                                 
7 De Zeeuw, “Projects do not create institutions”, 482. 
8 Przeworski et al. “Democracy and Development”, Grimm and Leininger, “Not all good things go together”. 
9 Acemoglu et al., “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”. 
10 Wright, “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” 
11 Doucouliagos and Paldam, “Conditional Aid Effectiveness.” 
12 Kosack, “Effective Aid”; Burnside and Dollar, “Aid, Policies and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence”; Wright, 
“Aid Effectiveness and the Politics of Personalism”. 
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increasing accountability, better evaluation and learning from results.13 These donor-side 
problems are mirrored well in the international aid effectiveness agenda, especially in 
documents like the Paris Declaration (2005) or the Busan Partnership (2011). 
However, democracy aid is also distinct from foreign aid, making it unclear just how much 
the recommendations for effective foreign aid are valid for the case of democracy aid. 
Democracy aid does not directly aim to support development, although developmental 
approaches to democracy assistance do not ignore it either,14 but to promote a transition to 
democracy or support the consolidation of new(er) democratic regimes. It also takes different 
forms: while foreign aid projects are associated with visible and directly measurable outputs 
like roads or hospitals, democracy aid focuses on supporting democratic institutions and 
procedures, the reform of democratic governance by state institutions  or civil society and the 
media.15 Instead of large scale financial transfers to the recipient state, democracy aid 
generally involves technical assistance (expert advice, training workshops, study visits etc.), 
or direct financing to support the activities of various non-state actors. 
Unlike the Paris Declaration or the Busan Partnership, no internationally adopted document 
has laid down guidelines on how to increase the effectiveness of democracy support. This can 
be explained by the fact that evaluating the effectiveness of democracy aid is particularly 
challenging. In terms of methodological problems, Burnell highlights the difficulty of 
defining and measuring the dependent variable, democratic progress; establishing causal 
linkages between outputs (e.g. the number of CSOs trained) and impacts (democratic 
progress), or between the input of a particular donor and the general progress of the recipient 
country, which is influenced by multiple factors; or even establishing a realistic timeframe in 
which to expect results.16 Additionally, carrying out the evaluations also poses political and 
logistic challenges, raising questions about the motivations behind the evaluation, the 
potential for bias, the frequent lack of financial and human resources or the pressure to search 
for low-hanging fruits to validate success.17 
Even if these challenges were to be addressed, the variety of (country) cases and the 
complexity of democratization processes would still render it difficult to identify 
generalizable good practices. The ignorance of the context and the failure to develop a 
suitable, well thought-through strategy can easily hamper effectiveness: in different political 
contexts democracy aid needs to have different goals and should target those through different 
                                                 
13 Knack and Rahman, “Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients”; Riddel, “Does 
Foreign Aid Work?”; Guljarani, “Organising for Donor Effectiveness”; Bingsten and Tengstam, “International 
Coordination and the Effectiveness of Aid.” 
14 Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental?” 
15 Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25.” 
16 Burnell, “Does International Democracy Promotion Work?” 
17 Green and Kohl, “Challenges of Evaluating Democracy Assistance.” 
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means, identifying the appropriate stakeholders for cooperation, the suitable time to use 
various instruments or the sequencing of support measures.18 
Democracy aid does not operate in a vacuum and is faced with conflicting objectives, which 
often go unaddressed by the donors. The lack of strategic considerations concerning these 
conflicts (e.g. between promoting democracy and/or stability) can impact the effectiveness of 
democracy assistance negatively.19 The situation is similarly problematic when the donor’s 
goals are ill-defined.20  
Indeed, due to the nature of democracy aid, it is primarily the donors’ responsibility to 
develop practices and find the context-specific means that can improve effectiveness.21 
Although overarching good practices are hard to draw due to the reasons mentioned above, 
some lessons have emerged over the course of the past decades. Carothers has identified a set 
of such lessons,22 which could be regarded as baseline criteria for donor-side effectiveness, 
although they are not sufficient guarantees for success. These include the need to develop a 
good understanding of the contexts donors operate in, which requires a presence in the given 
country and analytical capacities devoted to making sense of developments. Ready-made 
solutions offered by the donors can be harmful, and they should rather focus on identifying 
and supporting locally generated change. Donors should support rooted and legitimate NGOs, 
as opposed to often detached elite advocacy groups and should ensure CSOs strengthen their 
domestic constituencies.23 Despite the difficulties, donors need to follow up, evaluate and 
learn from their activities. Finally, cooperation with other democracy supporters as well as 
partnership with donors of development aid can also contribute to increasing the effectiveness 
of democracy aid. 
Democracy aid, like development aid, often involves technical assistance, thus insights from 
the literature on development aid might hold some lessons for democracy aid, too. Technical 
assistance is usually seen as highly donor-driven and not necessarily aligned with the needs of 
the recipients.24 Donors may have experience in certain areas, which they are keen to transfer, 
but this may not be what the recipient needs most. Many donors have been accused of 
exporting Western models, which do not work in recipient contexts. Indeed, the Busan 
Partnership emphasizes the importance of partners setting their own development priorities.25 
                                                 
18 Gräwingholt et al., “The Three Cs of Democracy Promotion Policy.” 
19 Grimm and Leininger, “Not All Good Things Go Together.” 
20 Wetzel and Orbie, “Promoting Embedded Democracy?” 
21 Burnell, “Does International Democracy Promotion Work?” 
22 Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25.” 
23 See also Fagan, “Taking Stock of Civil-Society Development in Post-communist Europe.” 
24 Godfrey et al., “Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy.” 
25 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 11. 
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Most of the funds spent on technical assistance often “end up in the bank accounts of 
consultants from high-income countries.”26 
Based on this overview of the literature on foreign and democracy aid effectiveness, the 
paper’s analytical framework proposes three cumulative but foundational criteria for assessing 
the supply side of Czech and Polish democracy aid: supporting locally driven change, 
learning from results, and coordination. This framework incorporates a significant portion of 
the aid effectiveness conditions discussed by the literature, yet it keeps the analysis concise 
and manageable by streamlining those. Additionally, these three criteria focus on the supply 
side effectiveness of democracy aid, that is the frameworks and procedure on the donor side, 
without getting entangled in assessing the actual impact of democracy aid. 
Support for locally driven change is a compound criterion to assess to what degree the donor 
takes into account the local context, including, (1) if and how it seeks alignment with the 
reform priorities identified by state recipients; (2) if and how it addresses the needs of non-
state actors, by, for example, engaging with bottom-up, locally driven initiatives; and (3) 
whether the donor has the ability and capacities to analyse the local context and tailor its 
assistance accordingly, which includes the ability to strike the right balance between state and 
non-state actors. .27 Support for locally driven change, as Carothers also suggests, is not 
guided by the donor’s models and priorities, but emphasizes the need for a clear sense of 
ownership on the recipient’s side and alignment to local needs,28 be they defined by the state 
or by non-state actors. When working with state actors, well aligned democracy aid considers 
the priorities set by the (ideally reform-minded), government, but should reflect on their 
intentions and credibility as well. Working with non-state actors requires reaching out to and 
empowering embedded local stakeholders who can provide local solutions. These can be 
achieved through mechanisms of close consultations during the planning and programming 
phases of democracy aid, or by granting recipient actors, including state actors and CSOs, 
wide possibilities in identifying how to spend the assistance. Finding the balance that can 
improve the effectiveness of democracy aid is heavily dependent on the donor’s capacities to 
analyze the local context, and channel this analysis into policy. 
The second criterion, learning from results, focuses on whether the donors make efforts to 
learn from their practices and their impact in the local contexts of the given recipients. 
Keeping in mind that democratic change can take a long time, donor commitment and the 
improvement of the donor’s practice are crucial. Aid agencies thus need to learn from their 
experiences, and improve their practice based on lessons from the field.29 Regular 
independent evaluations can provide such insights and can also make donors more 
accountable, especially if their results are published. Donors also need to put organizational 
                                                 
26 Easterly and Pfutze, “Where Does the Money Go?”, 33. 
27 Gräwingholt, et al. especially emphasize the importance of context sensitivity and the need for a strategy for 
long-term systemic support. 
28 Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25”. Leininger and Ziaja, “Conflicting Objectives in Democracy Promotion” 
put much emphasis on avoiding the imposition of donors ideas, or as they call it, the “blueprint trap”. 
29 Green and Kohl, “Challenges of Evaluating Democracy Assistance.” 
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mechanisms and procedures into place (e.g. regular policy reviews), which build on these 
evaluations to create a feedback loop in order to improve the effectiveness of democracy aid 
by adjusting the donors’ practice over time.30 
Finally, the criterion of coordination refers to how donor agencies responsible for democracy 
aid work with others. This has two aspects: (1) an intra-donor aspect, i.e. how well democracy 
aid is coordinated with development or even humanitarian aid from the same donor;31 and (2) 
an inter-donor aspect referring to the way the donor coordinates its democracy aid with other 
donors. Improving inter-donor coordination can be achieved in several ways, representing 
different intensities of coordination. On the lowest level, donors can meet regularly to 
exchange information on their activities in the given country, while more advanced 
coordination can mean joint programming, funding or implementation.32  
Before applying these three criteria to Czech and Polish democracy aid practices in Georgia, 
the following section provides a brief review of the emergence of CEE countries as donors of 
democracy aid.  
 
The CEE countries as democracy promoters  
The Czech Republic started its international development policy in 1995, followed by Poland 
and other CEE countries after the turn of the Millennium. This process, as well as the 
subsequent evolution of these policies has been well documented in the literature.33 Most CEE 
countries chose to emphasise their recent experiences gained through transition to democracy, 
market economy, and integration in the EU as an added value to their approach to 
international development cooperation, and many of them have made the promotion of 
democracy an integral part of these activities.34 They choose most of their partner countries 
from the Western Balkans and the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, as many of these countries 
were still engaged in similar transformation processes, making them logical recipients of the 
type of democracy aid these donors sought to offer. 
The CEE states see themselves as having a special added value in democracy aid projects in 
transition countries, due to the experience they have amassed during their own transition 
processes.35 According to this ‘transition narrative’,36 their transition puts them into a unique 
                                                 
30 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 12. 
31 See also Grimm and Leininger, “Not All Good Things Go Together.” 
32 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 25. 
33 See Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, New Europe’s New Development Aid.  
34 This is of course not to say that democracy promotion based on transition experience is the only international 
development priority these two countries have. Both countries align, at least in their written strategies, to the 
general priorities of development voiced by the EU or the OECD, including poverty reduction and sustainable 
development (see Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, New Europe’s New Development Aid).  
35 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.  
36 Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, “Central and Eastern European Transition Experience.” 
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position to effectively support democratic change and consolidation in partner countries who 
harbour similar goals. This narrative allows the CEE countries to portray themselves as 
different in comparison to ‘traditional’ donors, who may have more resources, but lack first-
hand experience with transition, which often renders their assistance irrelevant.37 The CEE 
countries, on the other hand, portray themselves as able to provide highly relevant assistance, 
which is well aligned with local contexts and national reform needs, and thus can be more 
effective in stimulating progress towards the desired outcome, greater democracy. 
Reflecting this understanding, support for democracy is listed among the priorities of most 
CEE countries’ official development assistance, and many of them have created dedicated 
organisational structures, in addition to their structures focusing on development and 
humanitarian assistance, to promote it. In the Czech Republic, the ‘Act on Development 
Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid and Amending Related Laws’ lists the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and good governance among the priorities of Czech development 
assistance, and the development cooperation strategy for 2010–2017 lists democracy 
promotion and human rights as a sectoral priority. A separate department responsible for 
transition promotion and human rights was set up in the MFA to run the country’s Transition 
Promotion Program (TPP), aimed at supporting democratic transition in partner countries. In 
Poland, the multiannual development cooperation program for 2012–2015 lists democracy 
and human rights as a cross-cutting thematic area supported by Polish development assistance 
and refers to Poland’s credentials by enlisting its post-1989 transition experience. 
Furthermore, the country created the Solidarity Fund, a foundation aiming to support 
‘democracy in countries undergoing political transformation, by offering assistance in 
bringing about democratic changes to societies which cannot, under the incumbent regimes, 
co-decide their fate, and by supporting observance of human rights worldwide’.38 
While some contributions in the literature have been rather upbeat about the potential of the 
CEE countries to contribute effectively to democratization in their partner countries,39 others 
have questioned just how well the transition narrative performs in practice. Horký,40 as well 
as Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot41 have both questioned just how much transition experience can 
be seen as a comparative advantage in democracy promotion, and whether it is not more than 
a self-legitimising discourse. It is difficult however to draw any clear conclusions, as there 
have been few formal, impartial, and methodologically sound impact assessments of CEE 
democracy aid activities to date. 
When it comes to evaluating how serious the CEE countries are beyond their rhetoric about 
providing democracy aid, a look at the share of democracy aid in their development aid 
disbursements shows that financially they cannot be seen as ‘democracy promotion “heavy 
                                                 
37 Poszpieszna, “When Recipients Become Donors.” 
38 See the Fund’s website at http://solidarityfund.pl/en/. 
39 See for example Poszpieszna, “When Recipients Become Donors.” 
40 Horký, “The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition Experience’ to the South.” 
41 Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot, “Central and Eastern European Transition Experience.”  
10 
 
hitters”’.42 While they spend a relatively larger share of their foreign aid on democracy aid 
than more established donors (see Table 1), these are still small amounts due to their very 
limited aid budgets. For example, the Czech Republic and Poland spent a total of 7 and 19.2 
million dollars respectively in 2015 on supporting ‘government and civil society’ in their 
partner countries (OECD 2017).43 These amounts are further fragmented into a multitude of 
tiny projects, mostly implemented by NGOs and public administration organisations based in 
the donor country, and generally take the form of technical assistance.  
 
<TABLE 1 > 
 
Although the absolute amounts of democracy aid are small, their effectiveness still matters. If 
these countries want to live up to their rhetoric on being more effective promoters of 
democracy in transition countries, they need to make efforts to develop effective supply-side 
frameworks, procedures and practices.  The following section investigates to what extent the 
Czech Republic and Poland have managed to develop these in the context of Georgia.  
 
Czech and Polish democracy aid to Georgia 
Descriptive details 
Both countries have engaged in supporting development and democratic consolidation in 
Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution, when the pro-Western, government of Mikheil 
Saakashvili came into power,44 but it was after the Georgian-Russian war in 2008 that their 
development relations became significant. The Czech Republic tripled its assistance in 2008 
compared to 2007, and Poland almost doubled it. 2009 was a peak year for Czech and Polish 
assistance, and annual aid flows have since then remained substantially higher than in 2007 
(see Table 2), which can signify continued commitment from the donors’ side. 
 
<TABLE 2 > 
 
Table 2 reveals that approximately a third of the Czech assistance to Georgia can be classified 
as democracy aid. Data for Poland only exist after 2013, and show a slightly lower ratio. 
Details for individual projects funded by the two countries are incomplete, but both the Czech 
and Polish embassies have published brochures which give some degree of overview of their 
                                                 
42 Petrova, The New Role of Central and Eastern Europe in International Democracy Support, 18. 
43 Based on data from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. Aid spent on ‘Government and civil society’ is 
the best available proxy for democracy aid, given that neither the Czech Republic, nor Poland publishes statistics 
on the exact amounts of their democracy aid. 
44 For more about the Rose Revolution, see Jones, “The Rose Revolution.” 
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activities. Based on these and annual reports, it is possible to identify some of the main areas 
of democracy aid and the types of projects that are implemented by the two donors in 
Georgia. 
Czech democracy aid after 2008 was allocated through two channels: the development 
assistance policy of the country, but more importantly the TPP. Based on projects reported by 
the Czech Development Agency (CzDA),45 the former concentrated predominantly on public 
administration reform and capacity building in various sectors, while the latter focused mainly 
on the local level, including NGOs and local authorities. The goal was to strengthen NGOs’ 
involvement in decision-making and improve their relations with local authorities. With 
regards to local authorities, Czech aid supported public finance management trainings to 
foster transparency and develop their capacities. 
A focus area of Polish democracy support has also been local administration development, 
and in 2008-2010 Poland was allegedly the biggest donor focusing on this area. In 2011, the 
Solidarity Fund launched extensive cooperation with NGOs to strengthen civil society and 
citizens’ participation in the political life of Georgia. In 2012, Poland started to provide 
courses for Georgian officials on management of public finances, security and defence policy; 
and by starting the Strategic Economic Needs and Security Exercise (SENSE), on the 
principles of a functioning market economy.46 
 
Supporting locally driven change 
Democracy aid is more effective when donors make efforts to align it with the needs and 
priorities of the recipient, including state and non-state actors, and whether they have the 
analytical capabilities to determine how exactly to work with these actors. On the state level, 
Georgia’s reform priorities have mainly been formulated, together with the EU, by generally 
reform-minded governments, and thus can be considered to reflect a more genuine wish for 
the country’s democratization. The EU’s ENP Action Plan, signed with Georgia in 2006, 
outlined the reforms Georgia should implement under the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) that provided the framework for EU-Georgia relations since 1999. These 
reforms were accepted by Georgia as well: ‘The ENP Action Plan is largely consistent with 
Georgia’s vision,’ and reflects the priority areas for reform emphasised by the Prime Minister 
in Parliament in February 2005. The government accepted a Medium-Term Action Strategy 
for 2007-10, which aimed to implement the actions listed in the ENP Action Plan. The first 
priority area in the Action Plan clearly related to strengthening democratic governance.47  
Subsequently, Georgia signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU in June 2014, 
including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Implementing these 
requires serious political, economic and trade-related reform along with wide-ranging 
                                                 
45 Embassy of the Czech Republic, The Czech Development and Transition Projects. 
46 Polish Aid, Georgia; Embassy of Poland in Georgia, Georgian-Polish Development Co-Operation 2008-2010. 
47 European Commission, EU/Georgia Action Plan, 4. 
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alignment with the EU acquis. The AA also put a strong emphasis on political reform, listed 
under the section of ‘political dialogue and reform’. Georgian interviewees, both from CSOs 
and the state administration, when asked about the priorities of the country where external 
support is needed, mainly pointed towards the implementation of both the AA and the 
DCFTA, thus endorsing the reform agenda set for Georgia jointly with the EU.48 
To what extent do Czech and Polish democracy aid seek to take these into account? Simply 
put, the processes through which their democracy aid, and indeed other aid, are planned 
towards Georgia do not ensure alignment at all. The following statement by an interviewee 
implies that very little discussion with the Georgian officials goes into planning the 
assistance: 
We have contacts with the [Georgian] ministries, but it is mainly our ambassador 
informing them of what we are doing. We do not ask the ministries what we should 
do, and we don’t make policy together. Lobbying the government is left to the big 
donors.49 
In fact, neither country has developed clear strategic approaches, (publically available) 
documents, or any specific frameworks for Georgia which would reflect in-depth 
considerations for a country-specific strategy, and which could, in turn, serve as a reference 
point for their democracy promotion activities. The Czech Republic has strategies for its 
‘program countries’, but Georgia is classified as a ‘project country’. While Poland classifies 
Georgia as a priority partner country, it does not publish strategy papers. Thus, without 
written strategies, the aid provided to Georgia remains ad hoc to some degree, and it is also 
much more difficult to identify the steps that have been taken to ensure alignment with the 
Georgian context. The lack of strategies may signify that neither country devotes the 
necessary analytical capacities to making sense of the Georgian situation.  
The ad hoc nature of assistance is strengthened by the practice that both donor countries 
implement the bulk of their democracy aid through open calls for proposals and on a project-
basis, which hampers overarching planning and purposeful alignment, and explains that the 
partner is only informed ex-post.50 While this bottom-up logic could be beneficial to channel 
local stakeholder interests (which in turn could make assistance to Georgia aligned with 
locally driven change even if clear strategies are missing), room for Georgian initiatives is 
rather limited. Proposals for projects need to be submitted to the MFAs generally by 
Czech/Polish NGOs or government agencies. Involving a Georgian partner in the proposal is 
required in the Czech Republic, but not in Poland, although a Polish interviewee has stated 
that proposals involving local partners have higher chances of success.51 An exception is the 
Czech Republic’s funding for human rights and transition projects, which is only accessible 
for Georgian NGOs, but it is restricted to tiny projects (usually below €5,000). Additionally, 
                                                 






Czech and Polish government agencies also have funds – usually outside the formal 
development assistance frameworks and managed without MFA involvement – for 
cooperation with their Georgian counterparts. The fact that both donors encourage the 
participation of Georgian NGOs can be seen as a tool to ensure some degree of sensitivity to 
supporting locally driven change, but it is ultimately still Czech or Polish NGOs and 
government agencies which initiate the projects.52  
Despite these problems inherent in the way Czech and Polish democracy aid is delivered, 
almost all interviewees, both from the donor side and, more importantly, the Georgian 
governmental and NGO sides have argued that the democracy assistance of the two donors is 
very relevant to the Georgian context. While this may seem paradoxical, a Georgian 
government official argued that while there are problems of coordination between the CEE 
countries and the Georgian government, these countries understand the needs of Georgia 
better than other donors, and have experience in similar reforms which are needed to 
implement the DCFTA in Georgia.53 Thus, even without explicit mechanisms to ensure that 
democracy aid answers to local needs, Czech and Polish aid is generally considered relevant. 
Representatives of Georgian NGOs have all supported this point, and argued that beyond the 
transition experience, the international networks to which CEE NGOs open Georgian NGOs 
up to through joint projects are often much more valuable than the support itself. These 
networks constitute important sources of learning much needed for Georgian NGOs, 
including on techniques of monitoring the government and engaging in better advocacy work.  
Czech and Polish government officials can of course be biased and may be reluctant to admit 
potential problems about the relevance of their assistance. The responses of Georgian NGOs 
who receive funding from these two governments can also be biased to a certain degree. 
However, there is reason to believe that this was not the case: many of the Georgian NGO 
respondents were actually very critical on other aspects of Czech and Polish democracy aid, 
including their relatively small amounts and the attached bureaucratic burdens. To further 
control for potential biases in interviews, the available datasets of Czech and Polish projects 
in Georgia were also examined.54 Most of these, implemented by donor NGOs, show a good 
degree of alignment with Georgian priorities. A clear recurring theme among these projects is 
increasing participation in local decision-making, campaigning for more transparent public 
administration, and involving young people in political processes. Polish government entities, 
including municipalities, have also provided aid to their Georgian counterparts in terms of 
increasing transparency and openness towards their citizens. These projects resonate well with 
the broad priorities in the AA on strengthening democratic institutions and respect for human 
rights. An independent evaluation of Czech democracy support to Georgia between 2008 and 
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2013, commissioned by the MFA, also found the overall relevance of Czech assistance to be 
‘rather high’.55  
Nevertheless, all this seems to be rather by chance than design, given that there is little 
strategic analysis behind the donor’s decisions, and no formal ex-ante engagement with the 
government. Working with locally embedded non-state actors could also be improved by 
giving them stronger opportunities to initiate projects, especially in the case of Poland. 
 
Learning from results 
CEE aid agencies generally do not perform well in terms of evaluating their practice and 
following up on these evaluations.56 It is argued that evaluations are often seen as criticism of 
government activities, and thus CEE governments resist it.57 While the Czech Republic has 
been carrying out evaluations of its development policy since 2003, the earliest available 
evaluations are from 2012. No evaluation reports are available for Poland before 2012 either. 
This means that development evaluation is a relatively new phenomenon among these 
countries, and even if the practice is now present, it is rather isolated: the individual 
evaluations generally focus on a few projects implemented in a given partner country in a 
specific sector. Whole-of-country or cross-sectoral evaluations are rare. The focus of the 
evaluations typically changes each year, and is defined by the MFAs and their interests at a 
given time. Furthermore, they certainly do not cover the entirety of the donor countries’ 
development and democracy aid.  
In the Czech Republic, ex-post evaluations are carried out by external evaluators who are 
generally experts in the field. The evaluations usually group together several projects that 
have been implemented in a specific partner country in the same field. The results of the 
evaluations are made public through the MFA’s website, with at least their summaries 
translated to English. Evaluations are partly based on the monitoring conducted by the 
embassies and by the CzDA, but also go beyond this data. The earliest available evaluation 
about projects specifically in Georgia is from 2012, and the latest was published in 2016. The 
scope of the projects evaluated include health care (in 2013), agriculture (in 2012, 2015, 
2016), which were indeed two key areas of Czech development support in Georgia, and there 
is also a comprehensive, but not all encompassing, evaluation of several democracy and 
human rights assistance projects implemented as part of the TPP between 2008 and 2013, 
published in 2014.58 This evaluation provided mixed results, and argued that while the 
evaluated projects did manage to engage local actors, they were less successful in promoting 
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long term change. The report also formulated recommendations on how Czech democracy aid 
to Georgia could be improved, including focusing on larger and longer-term projects, 
coordinating activities with other donors, as well as better planning.  
In the case of Poland, the selection of projects for evaluation is based on the decision of the 
MFA, and can concern (groups of) projects or annual programs including activities financed 
and/or implemented by the MFA and the Solidarity Fund. Polish development activities 
implemented in Georgia have been evaluated multiple times, but only a part of them can be 
categorised as democracy aid, such as the SENSE training program, and projects addressing 
institutional reform in social care implemented in 2010-2011 (evaluated in 2012), support for 
SMEs in Georgia facilitating economic transformation (evaluated in 2014), and finally, 
democracy assistance projects sponsored by the Solidarity Fund (evaluated in 2015 alongside 
projects implemented in Tunisia and Ukraine).59 The evaluations were carried out by 
independent contractors and the evaluations provided practical recommendations to the MFA, 
the Polish Embassy in Georgia and project originators respectively. In certain cases, e.g. the 
SENSE program, the evaluation formulated clear suggestions for Poland’s next multi-annual 
planning period as well. 
Although the system of evaluations is still relatively new in both Poland and the Czech 
Republic, some lessons can be drawn based on their practice. As previously mentioned, 
neither country has detailed and bilaterally agreed country strategies with Georgia. In the 
absence of these, the relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of certain projects can 
be studied, but can only be benchmarked either against the goals and objectives of the given 
project, or a broader and thus vaguer set of priorities outlined in higher level multiannual 
strategies. The evaluation cannot compare results to goals specifically tailored for, and with 
Georgia. Furthermore, the evaluations have neither been extensive, nor systematic to date. 
They have only covered a small part of these donors’ democracy aid activities in Georgia, 
thus only limited feedback could have been channelled into subsequent project cycles. Indeed, 
based on interviews, feedback and learning loops seem to be missing.60 While evaluations of 
Czech and Polish democracy aid to Georgia both mention specific recommendations, there are 
no mechanisms in place in either country to ensure that these are channelled into future 
project planning. Staff at the Czech and Polish embassies in Tbilisi had no clear examples of 
evaluations leading to changes in their practice.61 A diplomat from one of the countries argued 
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Intra-donor coordination is generally an issue in donor countries which have highly 
fragmented institutional set-ups for aid delivery.63 The two countries significantly differ on 
this, with the Czech Republic having a rather centralised system with the MFA and the CzDA 
at its centre, while in Poland the MFA plays a relatively weak coordinating role, and all line-
ministries have some degree of international development activity. As discussed above, both 
countries have created separate mechanisms for democracy aid, mainly with the goal of 
providing their democracy aid (and transition experience) greater visibility, but which at the 
same time exacerbate coordination issues. 
In the Czech Republic, democracy aid in the framework of the TPP is run by a separate 
department (Human Rights and Transition) in the MFA than development, and the CzDA is 
less involved in these projects. On the other hand, many projects supported by the CzDA also 
have clear democracy promotion elements. While the two MFA departments and the CzDA 
are said to work closely, their calls for proposals are not synchronised.64 The evaluation report 
of Czech democracy aid to Georgia65 also stressed the need for greater coordination between 
the Human Rights and Transition department and the CzDA, in terms of programming, 
planning and monitoring. In the Polish case, an important coordination problem is raised by 
the fact that the democracy aid activities of individual government entities, including central 
and local government, do not go through the MFA. The budget for these activities is 
decentralised, and the MFA is often only ex-post informed about what is going on. The 
evaluation of the Solidarity Fund activities revealed the insufficiency of intra-donor 
cooperation among the MFA, the Fund and the Polish Embassy in Georgia.66 
In terms of coordinating among donors, the mechanism in Georgia is operated by the 
European Commission’s Delegation, which involves regular meetings of the development 
councillors from the EU member states’ embassies. The main priority of the Commission is to 
get the member states on board in terms of supporting the reforms outlined in the AA, but 
some states, especially the bigger ones, have agendas of their own.67 The EC has no legal 
power to ensure that the member states take each other’s actions into consideration, thus 
coordination meetings are at times little more than talking shops where each donor provides 
an update of their ongoing and planned activities. Among the CEE countries present in 
Georgia, the Czech Republic was seen as the most active in this forum, which can most likely 
be ascribed to the personality of its development diplomat. The evaluation report mentioned 
above however draws attention to the fact that the Czech Republic’s democracy aid in 
Georgia would greatly benefit from engaging in ‘joint programming, co-funding, monitoring 
and evaluation especially with the EC delegation, […] and potentially also with other donors’. 
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At the same time, Poland has been perceived as less active in EC-led donor coordination.68 
The abovementioned evaluations provide a modest picture, too. The review of Polish aid for 
SMEs showed that no conflict occurred in the implementation of project activities with other 
donors and suggested that the supported projects filled a niche in Georgia. However, there is 
no indication that Poland would have sought cooperation with other donors to identify 
potential synergies either.  
CEE interviewees themselves were surprisingly silent about their own inter-donor 
coordination efforts. One interviewed diplomat simply stated: ‘Ask the European 
Commission, they are responsible for coordination, not us.’69 Another stated that they 
coordinate their activities by ex-post informing the relevant Georgian government officials, 
on the assumption that they will then use this information to coordinate the work of other 
donors.70 Georgian officials interviewed however argued that there are examples of 
duplications among projects funded by the two countries, and that they should step up their 
coordination efforts.71 The government formulates an annual action plan on the 
implementation of AA reforms, and these plans could serve as starting points for 
coordination. It is unclear however to what degree the donors, CEE and other, make use of 
this, and whether the Georgian government would have the capacities to lead coordination. 
Based on these results, there clearly seems to be little emphasis in the case of the two donors 




This paper has explored the democracy aid activities of the Czech Republic and Poland in 
Georgia. The two countries have argued that their transition experience allows them to be 
more effective donors of democracy aid, especially in the post-Soviet region. But in order for 
these claims to be credible, the donors have to put efforts into ensuring the supply-side 
effectiveness of their democracy aid. Building on the literature on aid effectiveness, the paper 
outlined three key criteria for effective democracy aid – support for locally driven change, 
learning from results, and coordination – and mapped the performance of the Czech Republic 
and Poland in Georgia along these. 
The results of the analysis are summed up in Table 3, which leads to mixed conclusions: 
clearly, the two countries could do more to enhance the effectiveness of their democracy aid. 
Overall, their democracy aid based on transition experience seems to have some degree of 
alignment with Georgian priorities, but the processes through which Czech and Polish 
democracy aid are delivered lack strategic planning and any direct coordination with the 




71 Interviews #03 and #04.  
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Georgian government. Their focus on supporting and empowering local actors and initiatives 
is also limited, leaving much room for improvement. The two countries have already carried 
out some evaluations of their democracy, governance and human rights support in Georgia, 
and these evaluations generally meet the standards of such activities. There is nonetheless 
little explicit evidence of feedback loops and learning from results, without which the exercise 
does not complete its purpose. 
 
<TABLE 3 > 
 
Coordination is perhaps the weakest of the three criteria discussed in this paper. Both 
countries struggle with intra-donor coordination problems, and neither of them seem keen to 
advance inter-donor coordination efforts. To improve intra-donor coordination, donors will 
need to reform their development and democracy assistance systems, and move away from 
ex-post coordination towards more strategic planning involving key stakeholders. Increasing 
the potential for inter-donor coordination is largely dependent on the reform of intra-donor 
coordination: if the representatives on the ground are only ex-post aware of their own 
countries’ democracy support activities, it is impossible to increase the substance and 
effectiveness of inter-donor coordination. 
As interviews suggest, Czech and Polish narratives, positioning themselves as democracy 
promoters, have been received with interest among Georgian stakeholders, and they find the 
knowledge these donors can share relevant. However, there is much to be improved. The 
findings of the paper identify several ways through which the two donors can improve their 
democracy assistance policies to increase effectiveness in the post-Soviet region.  These 
findings are also relevant for the broader democratization literature. While democratization 
and democratic consolidation depend on a number of factors, many of which are beyond the 
control of democracy aid donors, donors can do much by improving their own practice. 
Nonetheless, in order to determine what the most common shortcomings are in the practice of 
donors and identify conclusions that are generalizable beyond the Czech/Polish-Georgian 
context and applicable to other donor-recipient contexts as well, more research is still needed.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Democracy aid of selected donors (annual averages for 2013-2015) 
Donor 
Democracy aid  
(million USD) 
Share of total 
aid budget (%) 
Donor 
Democracy aid  
(million USD) 
Share of total 
aid budget (%) 
Austria 36.0 4.7 Slovakia 4.2 23.3 
Czech Republic 8.5 12.4 Slovenia 4.2 17.5 
Denmark 133.5 6.3 Spain 116.8 13.2 
France 179.4 1.9 Sweden 911.2 20.5 
Germany 1,832.3 10.4 UK 870.0 10.5 
Japan 485.5 2.5 USA 4,188.6 14.5 
Poland 20.4 15.3 OECD DAC 
average 
432.2 10.8 
Source: authors, based on data from OECD (2017).  





Table 2. Total aid and democracy aid to Georgia from the Czech Republic and Poland, 2008-
2015 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Czech 
Republic 
Total aid 2.10 5.28 3.76 1.84 2.57 2.84 2.88 3.29 
Democracy aid .. .. .. 0.49 0.87 0.98 1.01 1.04 
Poland 
Total aid 2.53 12.01 6.3 6.38 2.68 3.47 2.54 2.37 
Democracy aid .. .. .. .. .. 1.16 0.74 0.58 
Source: OECD (2017). 
In million dollars, 2014 prices and exchange rates. 
 
Table 3. Supply side effectiveness of Czech and Polish democracy aid to Georgia 




 No formal processes to ensure 
alignment to national priorities and 
identification of locally embedded 
stakeholders 
 Small grants fund available for local 
NGOs; involvement of Georgian 
partner required for projects 
 Assistance is perceived as relevant for 
local needs 
 No formal processes to ensure 
alignment to national priorities and 
identification of locally embedded 
stakeholders 
 No grant fund available for local 
NGOs; involvement of Georgian 
partner not required, but encouraged 
 Assistance is perceived as relevant 
for local needs 
Learning from 
results 
 Ad hoc evaluations 
 Relatively transparent 
 No feedback loops 
 Ad hoc evaluations 
 Less transparent 
 No feedback loops 
Coordination  Coordination between MFA 
departments and CzDA is problematic, 
but the number of actors is low 
 Active in EC-led donor coordination 
 Little engagement in tangible 
coordination efforts 
 The multitude of actors and the 
weakness of the MFA makes intra-
donor coordination difficult 
 Less active in EC-led donor 
coordination 
 Little engagement in tangible 
coordination efforts 
Source: authors 
